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How ‘Muslim’ are Central Asian Muslims? A Historical and Comparative Enquiry  
 
Abstract 
The article applies an integrated theoretical framework to analyze the social, political and 
symbolic functions of Islam in Central Asia corresponding to the present-day states of 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. It argues that throughout 
history Central Asians developed particular Central Asian Islam which presented a 
productive and fluid synergy between Islam per se and their tribal legal and customary norms 
and Tengrian and Zoroastrian beliefs and practices. It is characterized by a high level of 
doctrinal and functional adaptability to  shifting political and cultural environments, the  
prevalence of  Sufism (mystical Islam) and oral, rather than book-based, Islamic tradition. 
These intrinsic specifics have defined distinctive Islamic trajectories in post-Soviet Central 
Asia which differ significantly from those in other Muslim-majority countries and in Muslim 
communities in the West. At the same time, the common Eurasian space and lengthy shared 
political history of Central Asians and other peoples of Muslim Eurasia have accounted for 
considerable similarities in their Islamic trajectories.  
 
Key words: Central Asia, Eurasia, Russia, Silk Road, Nomadism, Islam, Sufism, Jihadism 
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 Introduction  
Central Asia
1
 - represented by the post-Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan – still remains rather poorly known and understood in 
the West.  At the policy level the region has been associated with its abundant energy 
resources, especially on the territory of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and its precarious 
neighbourhood with war-stricken Afghanistan and unpredictable Shi’a Iran.  In cultural 
terms,  Central Asian states  have been largely perceived as part of the Muslim world which 
were comparable  to Afghanistan, Pakistan and other ‘stans’ in terms of their economic 
development, social order, ethno-linguistics and the Islamic religiosity of its population. Such 
a narrow and functional approach to Central Asia
 
among Western policy-makers, NGOs and 
journalists has been complemented by the relative thinness and patchiness of the region’s 
scholarly coverage. Thus, the foci of English-language Central Asian studies have been 
contemporary issues, especially related to regime transition, energy politics and security,
 
 
drug trafficking,
 
 and the so-called Islamic revival and Islamic radicalization.   
The insufficient academic understanding in the West of Central Asia and in particular the role 
of Islam in it has been due to a number of reasons. One has been the domination of Central 
                                                          
1
   Here the term ‘Central Asia’ is used in the narrow sense, referring to the five post-Soviet 
states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. In the broader 
sense, the term ‘Central Asia’ refers to a wider region, which in different historical periods 
also included present-day Afghanistan, northwestern Pakistan, northern Iran, southern 
Caucasus, northern Turkey, northern India, north western China, Tibet, Inner and Outer 
Mongolia, and eastern Russia. In some studies the region is also referred to as Inner Asia, or 
Central Eurasia. See, for example, DiCosmo 2009; Erturk 1999; Sinor 1969 and Soucek 
2000.   
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Asian studies, as well as other regional studies, by social/political scientists who favour 
theoretical robustness over ‘messy’ empirics, an approach that tends to dissect selective and 
often policy-driven phenomena by means of established and intrinsically Eurocentric 
theoretical models and paradigms.
2
 Accordingly, they largely employ deductive, quantitative 
research methods and rely extensively on secondary, rather than primary, sources in English 
and, to a lesser extent in Russian.  This is not to say that there have been no in-depth and 
primary sources-based studies on Islam in Central Asia by a relatively small number of 
Islamic studies scholars, historians, anthropologists, ethnographers and sociologists.
3  
 
However, those have often had a narrow geographical, temporal, or thematic focus which 
obscured the wider picture.    
A second reason has been the post-Cold War influx into Central Asian studies of ex-
Sovietologists and Kremlinologists and their trainees, who consciously or unconsciously 
continue to view the Central Asian region and its constituent states as objects of powerful 
external political and religious impulses, rather than as self-defined and self-contained 
entities with its immanent characteristics and dynamics. A third reason has been  the general 
decline of  funding for inter-disciplinary area studies (despite the rhetorical trumpeting of 
inter- and multi-disciplinarianism), leading to a reduction in the number of Western scholars 
fluent in Central Asian and other languages of various peoples of the ex-USSR who are 
                                                          
2
 This, and other assessments related to the state of Central Asian and other regional studies 
in the West, is evidently subjective but based on the author’s experience of over two decades 
within Western academia.  
3
 See, for example, Bregel 2003;  Collins 2006; Crews 2006; d’Encausse 2009; DeWeese 
2012; Geiss 2003; Khalid 2007; Kugelgen 2004 and 2007; Louw 2008;   Meyer 2014;  
Peyrousse 2012; Privratsky 2001; Reeves 2014; Satoru 2014 and Tomohiko 2014. 
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capable of conducting in-depth empirical research in the region.
 
The arrival in Western 
universities of a notable number of students from Central Asia has not significantly altered 
this trend due to their largely uncritical acceptance of Eurocentric political/social science 
theoretical models. Yet another reason has related to the practical, logistical and political 
difficulties, bordering on impossibility, of conducting both historical and contemporary 
empirical research on Islam in present-day Central Asia - especially in Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and increasingly in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan - due to the authorities’ tight 
control over the religious sphere and the local people’s apprehension about any form of 
engagement in externally funded research on Islam-related topics.
 
 
The aforementioned epistemological difficulties and inadequacies have contributed to the 
emergence and recycling of a series of problematic perceptions and expectations regarding 
the social, political and religious development of Central Asia. Thus, in the early 1990s it was 
expected that the region would succumb to the political, economic and religious influence of 
its main Muslim neighbours (Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan).
4
 Later on, in the wake of the 
rising Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan, it was expected that the region would succumb to 
radical Islam, including  jihadism.
5
  In the second decade of the 2000s there appeared 
predictions of the region’s joining in the ‘Arab Spring’ and undergoing violent regime 
change.
6
   
This article attempts  to counter the prevailing compartmentalization of various cultural and 
socio-political phenomena of Central Asia through an inter-disciplinary integrated 
framework.   It will treat Central Asia as a historically and culturally self-sufficient region 
                                                          
4
 See, for example, Hunter 2000; Rashid 2000; Yavuz 2000.  
5
 See, for example, Karagiannis 2010 and  Rashid 2002.   
6
 See, for example, Schmitz and Walters 2012 and Government 2011.  
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with its intrinsic characteristics and dynamics.  At the same time it locates Central Asia 
within the spatial and cultural Eurasian context 7   and assesses the legacy of the Soviet 
transformation for its relations with some other parts of the post-Soviet space and the Middle 
East.
 
It argues that historically, the culture and identities of various peoples of Central Asia 
have been shaped by four major influences. One is associated with the ancient Sogdians, 
who, long before the arrival of Islam in Central Asia, created a distinctive Central Asian 
cultural blueprint which persisted throughout history. The second relates to the lengthy 
domination of Central Asia and wider Eurasia by Turco-Mongol nomads.  The third is to do 
with the  arrival of Islam in Central Asia in the seventh  century AD and the region’s 
subsequent Persianized Islamization. The fourth is linked to the late 19
th
 century Russian 
conquest, followed by Sovietization in the 20
th
 century. Since the disintegration of the USSR 
the Islamic dynamic in Central Asia has been marginally affected by the partial re-integration 
of the region within the wider Islamic world and the advancing globalization and 
digitalization of Islam.  
 
The Silk Road and the Role of the Sogdians   
The Sogdians were an Eastern Iranian people who originated from Sogdiana, an urbanized 
and highly developed state, which in the ancient period and the Middle Ages existed on the 
                                                          
7
 Here, the term ‘Eurasia’ is used to denote a socio-cultural area, rather than the much wider 
geographic region of Eurasia. It also differs from Russia-centred concepts of Eurasia and 
Eurasian ideology pioneered in the 1920s by Nikolai Trubetskoi and other Russian émigré 
intellectuals and re-appropriated and instrumentalized by post-Soviet Russian and 
Kazakhstani political elites. See more on ideological  Eurasianism  in  Laruelle 2012; Bassin,  
Glebov and  Laruelle 2015; and  Bassin 2016.   
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territory corresponding to the Samarqand- and Bukhara-centred regions of modern 
Uzbekistan and the Sughd region of modern Tajikistan. Later on the Arabs named this region 
Mawarannahr (‘what is beyond the river,’ i.e. Amu Darya - G.Y.], while the Romans called 
it Transoxania (‘land beyond Oxus’). Throughout their over fifteen centuries-long history, it 
was the Sogdians, rather than the Chinese, who acted as the main agents for the export and 
import of luxury goods along the Silk Road
8
  connecting China to Balkh (Bactria), India, 
Iran, and the Byzantine and the Hellenized Middle East, on the one side, and to the steppes of 
Eurasia, on the other.
9
  The Sogdian merchants were genuine ‘go-betweens,’ who  brought to 
Central Asia a diversity of music, cuisine, religions and belief systems, including 
Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Christianity. They also acted as facilitators for 
the exchange and transfer of practical and scientific knowledge and administrative skills.  
 
 In the sixth century AD the Sogdians introduced Turkic nomads of the steppes to their first 
alphabet, as well as their administrative infrastructure (De la Vaissiere 2011:15). In the eighth 
century AD they brought  paper production technology to the Middle East, and subsequently 
to Europe by optimizing  the paper-making process which they learned from Chinese  
prisoners, who were brought to  Samarqand in the wake of the Chinese Tan Dynasty’s defeat  
by the Arab Abbasid Caliphate in 751 AD in Talas (in modern Kyrgyzstan).  The Sogdian 
                                                          
8
 It is worth noting that contemporary geopolitical economic projects of the Silk Road, known 
as the China-driven ‘New Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the US-centred ‘The New Silk 
Road’ differ significantly from their historical predecessor in terms of geography and major 
actors and treat Central Asia as an object or a transit territory. See more in Devonshire-Ellis 
2015; Laruelle 2015; Peyrouse &Raballand 2015.  
  
9
 More on the role of the Sogdians in the Silk Road see in De la Vaissiere 2004. 
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paper-making know-how created the basis for the world’s largest library of the Middle Ages 
– Bayt al-Hikma/ Dar al-Hikma (The House of Wisdom) in Baghdad (Nurulla-Khojaeva 
2016). Thus, through centuries of multi-vector trade, economic and cultural activities, the 
Sogdians laid the foundation for the culture of religious and ethnic pluralism and  adaptability 
to rapidly changing political  environments.  
 
The Sogdian cultural input formed the cornerstone of Central Asian identity which persisted 
long after the demise of Sogdiana in the eight century AD in  the face of the Abbasid advance 
and the drastic changes in the Chinese imperial economy, which were triggered by the An 
Lu-shan rebellion
 
in China in 755 AD.
10
   In the  ninth
 
and tenth centuries most Sogdians, as 
well as the Khorezmians, Baktrians and some other of Central Asia’s sedentary people who 
spoke eastern Iranian dialects, were included within the Persian-dominated part of the 
Abbasid Caliphate and subsequently became culturally and linguistically  Persianized (i.e. 
switched from an Eastern Iranian to a Western Iranian language). 
11
  
 
The Sogdian legacy shaped the political culture of the Islamized Samanids who in 819-999 
AD created their state in Mawarannahr, which also encompassed the territories of present-
day  Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Samanid state soon acquired  de facto 
independence from its Abbasid suzerains in  Baghdad. Thus, while  the Samanid ruling elite 
was Persian-speaking and affiliated to Sunni Islam its subjects included sedentary and 
nomadic peoples of Persian, Turkic and other ethnic origins, who adhered to Sunni or  Shi’a 
                                                          
10
 During the An Lushan Rebellion, 755-763 AD, the Sogdians joined the anti-Tan forces  
(Pulleyblank 1955).  
11
 Compared to Tajiks, Pamiris of  Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan speak an East Iranian 
language (Bergne 2009: 5).  
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Islam, as well as  Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Christianity. The Samanids, like their 
Sogdian predecessors, encouraged the development of sciences and arts and their capital 
cities of Samarqand (819-892 AD) and Bukhara (892-999AD) rivalled Baghdad in terms of 
their advances in philosophy, sciences, arts and Islamic theology. They produced such great 
thinkers of the Middle Ages as Rudaki (858-941), Al-Farabi (872-950), Ferdowsi (940-1020), 
Al-Biruni (973-1048) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980-1037) who made major contributions to 
the development of medicine, pharmacology, geography, astronomy, physics,  mathematics 
and Islamic philosophy. A powerful reminder of the historical role of the Sogdians and  
Samanids has been  the  incorporation of the Samanid lineage into the nation-building project 
of post-Soviet Tajikistan (Dagiev 214: 127).  
 
 The Steppe Factor and the Turkic-Persian Fusion   
Another constituent part of the Central Asian culture and identity developed as a result of 
over five centuries of nomadic Turco-Mongol domination.
12
  In 999 AD the Samanids were 
defeated by the Turkic-speaking Qarakhanids who arrived from present-day southern 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and western Xinjiang, and who established in Mawarannahr the 
Qarakhanid Khanate (999-1211). In the 11
th
 century the western part of Central Asia was 
conquered by the Seljuks, the Oghuz Turks who came from the Aral Sea, and became part of 
                                                          
12
 Despite the centrality of the nomadic Turco-Mongol factor in the political and societal 
development of Muslim Central Asia, as well as some other parts of Eurasia, it has not 
received due credit in  historical studies on  the region, which were largely based on written 
sources emanating from representatives of town-centred   sedentary culture. The latter tended 
to highlight their cultural and political superiority over their nomadic counterparts (Masanov 
2007:65).  
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the vast Seljukid empire (1037-1194), which stretched from the Hindu Kush to eastern 
Anatolia and the Persian Gulf (1037-1194). The Seljuk linguistic imprint is present in  
Central Asia’s Oghuz-speaking Turkmen, as well as contemporary Turks and Azerbaijanis. In 
the early 13
th
 century Central Asia, along with most of Eurasia, was included within the 
enormous multi-ethnic and poly-confessional Mongol empire (1206-1368), created by  
Genghiz Khan (1162-1227). In the 14
th
 century the region became part of the Timurid empire 
(1370-1507), created by Timur (1336-1405),  a Mongol chieftain who modelled himself on 
Genghiz Khan.  
The lengthy Genghizid and Timurid domination emphasized the Eurasian dimension of 
Central Asia by creating considerable structural and cultural affinities between it and other 
Eurasian polities under extended Genghizid/Timurid control. In the political sphere the 
Genghizid/Timurid legacy manifested itself in the extreme concentration of power at the 
centre, the merger of the ruling clan with the state and the supremacy of personal relations 
between a ruler and a subject over any other relations, defined by  institutional, social, or 
ethno-national affiliation (Masanov 2007:116). It accounted for the rulers’ reliance on 
genealogical and kinship, rather than Islamic, mechanisms of legitimization of their authority 
and  for  people’s acceptance of the authority of rulers, irrespective of their policies, personal 
qualities and their conformity with Islamic requirements for a good ruler (Babadjanov 
2010:307).  It was responsible for the persistence of predominantly tribal identities among 
nomads and territorized local identities among various sedentary and urbanized Central 
Asians. It also channelled state formation in the region along the lines of loose poly-ethnic 
and poly-confessional empires with ill-defined frontiers compared to the formation of the 
national sovereign states of France, England, Spain and other polities  in post-Westphalian 
Europe (1648), which had clearly defined borders. The poly-ethnic and poly-confessional 
composition of nomadic empires facilitated  considerable inter-ethnic and inter-confessional 
10 
 
tolerance and the relative political insignificance of religion, ethnicity and language 
compared to the dichotomy between  nomads and non-nomads (Masanov 2007:95). This was 
quite different from  the centrality of religion in contemporary Europe which witnessed 
Crusades, the Catholic inquisition and protracted Catholic-Protestant internecine warfare.  
In the economic sphere the Genghizid-Timurid legacy accounted for the tribute-redistributary  
model  between the centre and the periphery. The nomadic practice of individual ownership 
of livestock, alongside collective ownership of land and water, was translated into the 
extreme power of the state, embodied by the ruler, and the relative weakness of both private 
landowners and cities, which symbolized particular rulers’ power and acted as merchant 
hubs- bazaars (trade markets).  This model differed from that in contemporary Western 
Europe, where the economic power of states/monarchs could be, and often was, challenged 
by the Church, regional gentry, as well as by  politically and economically  strong  cities, 
which enjoyed considerable autonomy from monarchs in the form of its representative bodies 
- the early  precursors of  civil society.
13
   
In the cultural sphere the Turco-Mongol impact is evidenced in the linguistic and 
demographic Turkicization of most Central Asians (with exception of Tajiks and Pamiris), 
while retaining  the Sogdian/Samanid cultural blueprint. From the 14
th
 century onwards, due 
to  the Sogdian/Samanid and nomadic Turkic  synergy,  the initial differences in  the way of 
life, culture and cuisine between the originally nomadic Turkic peoples,  who spoke different  
Turkic languages (Turki/Chagatay, Oghuz and Qipchak), and Persianized sedentary peoples 
became blurred and many Central Asians acquired  dual Turkic-Persian identities and spoke 
both languages. A case in point are the Turkic- and Iranian-speaking sedentary Sarts (Dagiev 
2014:21). On the other hand, the sedentarization of Uzbeks and some other Turkic peoples of 
                                                          
13
 For a detailed discussion of the Genghizid legacy see Yemelianova  2002:16-35.  
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Central Asia occurred in parallel with their cultural Persianization along Sogdian/Samanid  
lines. Thus, the Uzbek leaders, as well as some other Turkic rulers of the region, routinely 
employed Persian-dominated administrations (Roy 2005: 5, 6).  
The Turco-Mongol and Persian Islamic cultural synthesis strengthened the distinctiveness of 
Central Asian Islam
14
 and further distanced it from Islam in other parts of the former Abbasid 
domain. In this respect the ‘making’ of Central Asian Islam was quite different from that of 
other versions of regional Islam, for example, in Southeast  Asia, West Africa, or even in 
Turkey, which were never parts of Arab Caliphates and were Islamized at much later periods.  
From the 16
th
 century onwards Central Asian Islam
 
 acquired physical and political 
boundaries as a result of the consolidation of the Safavid empire (1501-1736),  the Ottoman 
empire (1299-1923) and  the Chinese empire, first under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and 
later under the Manchu dynasty (1644-1912), which sought the annexation of  Muslim-
dominated Xinjiang.
15
 On the other side, many centuries of common Turkic and Genghizid  
tutelage  interconnected  the politics, economies and cultures of the nomadic and sedentary 
inhabitants of Central Asia and wider Eurasia, including Russia, and therefore contributed to 
                                                          
14
 Here the term ‘Central Asian Islam’ is used to denote distinctive and integrated Central 
Asian Islamic dogmas, beliefs and practices, which have notable differences from Salafi (lit. 
‘of ancestors’) interpretations of the Islamic creed and practices, which are attributed by some 
Islamic scholars to the period of the first four hundred years after the Prophet Muhammad.     
15
 The borders between Central Asia and China remained undefined until the end of the 19
th
 
century, when Xinjiang was finally incorporated into China.
 
 Even so, until the 1930s these 
boundaries remained transparent and witnessed an exodus of Kazakhs and other nomads 
fleeing Stalinist sedentarization, collectivization and golodomor (death through hunger) 
(Abdakimov 2003:225).   
12 
 
their better mutual awareness and understanding, their ethnic intermingling, as well as their  
substantial mutual borrowings in the field of language, design, cuisine and beliefs  (Golden 
2011:89; Yemelianova 2002: 27).   It made for the emergence on the territory of present-day 
Russia of a Mongolic- and Turkic- speaking population adhering to Buddhism, 
Zoroastrianism, Tengrism, Shamanism, Judaism and Islam.
16
   
The Iranian and Turco-Mongol ethno-cultural fusion also distanced Central Asia and wider 
Eurasia, including Russia, from Europe.  In the period between the 11
th
 and 15
th
 centuries - 
i.e. when Central Asia and most of Eurasia, including proto-Russia, were parts of the 
Islamized Genghizid empire - European rulers were engaged in the papally-sanctioned 
Crusades in the Levant.  In the 16
th
 century Europe’s geographical and political 
disengagement from Islamic Asia was supplemented by the development of a racial 
superiority complex  towards Asians, especially Muslim Turks and ‘Tartars,’ as well as 
Orthodox Muscovites who were perceived as being on a par with ‘Tartars’ (Schimmelpennick 
2010:2).  These attitudes were conceptualized during the Renaissance and  Enlightenment 
periods, when the foundation for the modern Western ideas of liberty, progress, human rights 
and civic society was laid. These fundamental differences were reflected in  their respective 
historical narratives. Thus, most Central Asian and Eurasian historiographies emphasized the 
Irano-Turkic and Mongol cultural core of various peoples of the region represented by 
                                                          
16
 Among Russia’s Mongolian-speakers are Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvans, while 
Turkic/Qipchak-speakers include Muslim Tatars and Bashkirs of the Volga-Urals and 
Karachay and Balkars of the North Caucasus and Oghuz-speaking Muslim Azeris in 
Daghestan, as well as in the post-Soviet republic of  Azerbaijan. 
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Sogdians, Samanids in Central Asia and Scythians
17
 in Central Eurasia and various Turkic 
peoples across Eurasia (Novikov 1998).  By contrast, most European historiography anchored 
early European civilization in the ancient Greek and Latin heritage and treated nomads and 
Asians as an inferior other.   
 
The Islamic Factor 
Islam was brought to Mawarannahr by Arabs in the seventh century AD when Central Asia 
was formally included into the Arab Caliphate. However, the pace and nature of the region’s 
ensuing  Islamization were  largely determined by its inherent ethno-cultural and religious 
pluralism  shaped by  the  Sogdians. It defined such Central Asian Islamic perceptions as  the 
believers’ equal acceptance of God’s revelation and an individual’s capacity and will to act, 
as well as a largely cyclic and contemplative, rather than progressive and critical, worldview.  
By the end of the ninth century AD Islam had become the official religion of the Samanids.
18
 
The aforementioned promotion and patronage by the Samanids of scholarship and arts was 
conducive to the development of Islamic theology in the region. It is worth noting that  two 
out of six authoritative compilators of hadith
19
 among Sunni Muslims  were natives of the 
region. They were Mihammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (810-70) and Abu ‘Isa Muhammad al-
Tirmidhi (825-92).  
                                                          
17
 The Scythian empire existed in Central Eurasia between the ninth century BC and the first 
century AD.    
18
 See more on the Samanids in Frye 1975. 
19
 Hadith (pl. Ahadith) is an account of Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, or actions. It is 
regarded as the second, after the Qur’an, most important source of Islamic jurisprudence.  
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Of particular significance to the making of Central Asian Islam practiced was the 
contribution of local Islamic jurists. Among their leading representatives was  the  
Samarqandi Hanafi
20
 theologian  Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (853-944) who, along with the 
Shafi’i  theologian Abu al-Hasan al-Ash’ari  (873-935) in Iraq, created the two main schools 
of Sunni kalam ( (Islamic scholastic theology). The kalam of al-Maturidi, later known as Al-
Maturidiyya,   developed   in opposition to the Basra-based Mu’tazilite Islamic theological 
school, which prioritized reason and rational thought, and denied the eternal nature of the  
Qur’an. 21  By comparison, al-Maturidiyya significantly modified the creed of Islam and 
Hanafite doctrine by including in them elements of both the Mu’tazilite teaching and Central 
Asian non-Islamic customary norms and beliefs. As a result, Al-Maturidiyya asserted the 
supremacy of God in man’s acts alongside man’s capacity and will to act, and thus provided a 
doctrinal framework  for the  flexibility, adaptability and syncretism in Hanafi-based  Central 
Asian Islam (Yemelianova 2010:214) .  
The combination of the Sogdian-Samanid cultural matrix and Al-Maturidiyya paved the way 
for the proliferation in the region of a Persianized, rather than Arabized, understanding of 
Islam. The former drew on pre-Islamic Sassanid political, cultural and musical traditions and 
prioritized Sufi (mystical) Islam.  Sufis acted as the main agents of the Islamization of the 
Turco-Mongol nomads of the region.  Furthermore, Central Asia produced some of the 
leading Sufi scholars and teachers in the Islamic world. Among them was, for example, the 
Turkic-speaking Ahmed Yasawi (1093-1166), the founder of the Yasawiyya tariqa 
(brotherhood), who was born in the town of Sayram, today a suburb of Shymkent in  southern 
                                                          
20
 Hanafism is one of the four madhhabs (juridical schools) within Sunni Islam. The other 
madhhabs are Hanbalism, Shafiism and Malikism.  
 
21
 See more on Mu’tazilites in Martin 1997 and Choueiri 2010:2-3. 
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Kazakhstan. His followers played a central role in the proliferation of Islam among the 
nomads of the Kazakh steppe and in the wider Turkic world. Central Asia’s prominent 
Persian-speaking Sufis were Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi (1207-1273), a native of Balkh 
in present-day Afghanistan whose followers formed the tariqa of Mewlawiyya, and the most 
famous Sufi of Central Asia, Baha-ud-Din Naqshband (1318-1389), a native of Bukhara, who 
acquired a global following as the founder of the Naqshbandi tariqa.   
The nomadic essence of Genghizid-Timurid ruling elites further contributed to the pluralist  
outlook of  Central Asian Islam,  which absorbed other elements of paganism, nomadic 
customary norms, Zoroastrian, Tengrian and Shamanist beliefs and practices, as well as 
Nestorian Christianity. It also defined the supremacy in it of oral and ritualistic Islamic 
practices over scripture-based Islamic traditions. Among such Islamized,  although  originally 
pagan, customs  were,  for example, the hanging of pieces of coloured fabric on trees, the 
kissing of grave headstones, and the rubbing of dust over one’s face  (Yemelianova 
2010:213). The nomadic heritage of many Central Asians accounted for the strong role of 
female Islamic authority
22
 in regional Islam, which was personified by otyns (Sultanova 
2014:130).   It is also symptomatic that the major popular holiday in today’s Central Asia is  
Nowruz (Festival of spring),
23
 which in terms of its popularity and the scale and length of the 
festivities,   much exceeds the main Islamic holidays of  Kurban-Bayram (‘Id al-Adha)  and 
Uraza-Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr).   
                                                          
22
 This also applies to Russia’s Tatars and Bashkirs  where  abystays (female Islamic 
authorities) enjoy a high social status (Yemelianova  2003: 74-75).    
23
 Nowruz symbolizes, the cyclic nature of life and the contemplative world view (Babadjanov 
2010:640).  It is also widely celebrated among Azerbaijanis, Ossetians and Georgians in the 
Caucasus.   
16 
 
  The Russian Factor 
The rise of Christian Orthodox Russia
24
 as a major Eurasian power began following Ivan the 
Terrible’s conquest of the Muslim khanates of Kazan (1552), Astrakhan (1556) and Siberia 
(1582), the splinter states of the Genghizid Golden Horde, which ruled over proto-Russia 
between 1240 and 1480.  Russia’s Genghizid heritage acted as a facilitator for her eastward 
advance.
25
  By the late 18
th
 century, i.e. prior to Russia’s sustained advance into the Kazakh 
steppe and Central Asia, Russia conquered the last Genghizid remnants – the Nogay and the 
Crimean Khanates and became involved in the geopolitical and military rivalry with the 
Ottoman and Safavid empires.  On the other side, this rivalry was accompanied by their 
mutual  trade,   cultural borrowing, territorial delimitation and exchange of population, which 
were conducted on level terms. This contrasted with the nature of Europe’s engagement with 
Asia, which from the 15
th
 century onwards had been framed in Eurocentric and civilizational 
terms and accompanied by Christian missionary activism.  
In the case of Russia, the introduction of some elements of civilizational discourse in her 
relations with her Asian neighbours occurred much later and was prompted by the drive by 
Peter the Great (1672-1725) towards Russia’s symbolic Europeanization. Throughout the 19th 
century civilizational attitudes towards non-Russian natives were particularly prominent in 
St. Petersburg’s policies towards Central Asia, which were shaped by Russia’s Great Game 
                                                          
24
 In 988 AD kniaz (prince) Vladimir chose Orthodox Christianity as the official religion of 
Rus in order to juxtapose it with his major rivals Judaist Khazar Khaganate in the east and the 
Islamic Abbasid Caliphate in the south.   
25
 On the implications of Russia’s Eurasian expansion for the ensuing development of her 
polity and society see Yemelianova  2002:1-27. 
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with Britain.26  Russia’s Central Asian expansion received an impetus as a result of her defeat 
in the Crimean war (1853-56), which curtailed her territorial ambitions in the Middle East. In 
the 1860s Russia subjugated the Khanate of Kokand and   transformed it into the Ferghana 
province of Russian Turkestan, which was established in 1867 with its centre in Tashkent. By 
comparison, St Petersburg chose to preserve the territorial integrity of most of the Bukhara 
Emirate and the Khiva Khanate as Russian protectorates, which were modelled on British and 
French treaties with various princely states in India and North Africa respectively (Khalid 
1998: 15).  
Russia’s Eurocentric attitudes and policies towards and in Central Asia were largely of a 
superficial nature and did not override her inherent Eurasianism and her appreciation of the 
shared historical and cultural heritage of Russia and Central Asia (Schimmelpennick 2010: 
239).  It is symptomatic that even the Voltaire-influenced Catherine the Great had a profound 
respect for Islam as a civilizational force and chose to draw on the Ottoman millet system in 
her approach towards Russia’s Muslims.  In 1788 she  introduced the institution of  the 
muftiate in Orenburg as the agency of state management and control over Muslim subjects 
and  encouraged the Islamic proselytizing  activities of Tatars among  ‘unruly’  and 
religiously syncretic Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads (Mati 2012:37).   In the longer term, 
Catherine the Great’s Islamic policy, which combined Islam’s legalization and 
‘nationalization,’ cooptation and depoliticization, became the model of the Russian state-
Muslim relations.    
 Overall, due to Russia’s intrinsic Eurasianism, as well as her predominantly military and 
political (rather than social and cultural) domination over Central Asia, Central Asian Islam  
                                                          
26
 For a detailed analysis of the Great Game and its political and cultural implications for the 
region  see  Horkirk 1992 and Sergeev 2013.  
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retained most of its key characteristics especially among the majority of  Iranian-speaking 
Tajiks and Turkic-speaking Sarts/Uzbeks of the Bukhara Emirate and  the Khiva Khanate. 
The Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads remained  Muslims in a socio-cultural rather than in a 
religious sense and continued to associate mullas with misfortune and disaster (Masanov 
2007:121). However, Russian rule facilitated,  especially through the medium of Russo-
Native schools, the development among a small fraction of the Turkestani and Bukhara 
Muslim elite of a Central Asian version of jadidism (Islamic reformism),
27
 whose leading 
proponents   were  Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1874-1919), Abdurauf Fitrat (1886-1938) and 
Munawwar Qari (1878-1931).
28
     
It is also important to bear in mind that Russia’s exclusively Eurasian territorial expansion 
and her non-involvement in the European colonization of the Islamic Middle East, driven by 
Britain, France and some other European powers, accounted for the development  there of 
divergent  popular perceptions of Russia and Western Europe. They were particularly 
influenced by the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) between Britain and France, which  
divided the Ottoman Middle East according to their political and economic interests (access 
                                                          
27
 Jadidism was a specific Russian Islamic phenomenon. It was pioneered  by the Tatar 
Muslim elite in the 1880s in response to Russia’s modernization initiated by Alexander II  
(1818-1881).  It had some similarities with the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century Islamic 
reformism of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Rashid 
Rida (1865-1935) and Mirza Malkum  Khan (1833-1908), which, however, developed  as a 
reaction to  modernity emanating from outside.  See more  on Tatar-centred Jadidism in 
Yemelianova 1997. 
28
 See more on  Central Asian jadidism  in  Khalid 1998.  
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to oil reserves), rather than along ethno-cultural and religious lines, as well as by the British-
sponsored Balfour Declaration (1917), which  laid the foundation for the creation of the 
Jewish homeland in Palestine,  and subsequently, the  state of Israel.   
    
The Soviet Factor 
Although the Soviet period in the history of Central Asia has received comparatively more 
attention in Western scholarship,
 29
  it still remains to some extent a terra incognita. It has 
suffered more than other periods in the history of the region from a Moscow-centred   
perspective, which treats the Soviet Union as an empire and Central Asia as its colony.
30
 
This approach is responsible for a considerable misreading of Central Asia’s internal and 
external dynamics,
 31
 which were largely congruent with the developmental trajectories 
identified earlier. Because of this congruence the Bolsheviks managed to secure their 
position in Muslim Central Asia and in other parts of the Russian empire by 
instrumentalizing patterns of power relations, social mobilization and cultural awareness  
which had been reproduced  throughout  history across the whole of Eurasia, even if they  
                                                          
29
 Among in-depth studies of some aspects of Sovietization of Central Asia are Bennigsen 
and Wimbush 1985; Brower 2003; Fierman 1991; Kamp 2006; Ro’i 2000. 
30
 On the critique of the Eurocentric  approach towards Central Asia see, for example, Frank 
1999 and Nurulla-Hodjaeva 2016. 
31
  See, for example,  Bennigsen and  Wimbush 1985;  and  Rywkin 1982. 
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framed them now in Marxist   terms.
32
 Equally, they continued with Catherine the Great’s  
model of  state-Muslim  relations and even developed it  further.  
 
Nevertheless, the pluralistic and adaptable nature of Central Asian Islam ensured its 
survival under conditions of state atheism.  It acquired different forms and became 
dissolved within Sovietized national cultures. For example, some chaykhonas (tea-houses), 
bakeries, doma kul’tury (houses of culture), or other non-religious public places turned into  
undercover mosques with  improvised mihrabs (a niche in the wall directed towards the 
Kaaba in Mecca). Muslims continued to conduct ziiarats (visitations) to their Sufi mazars 
(shrines) now disguised as secular historical sites (Abashin 2015: 498-548; Salmorbekova 
and Yemelianova 2010: 216).   
  
The effects of Sovietization varied among different Central Asian Muslims. In the case of 
sedentary Tajiks and Uzbeks, the  Bolshevik assault on Muslim clergy
33
 and Islamic 
infrastructure, as well as the change of alphabet from Arabic to Latin and finally to Cyrillic 
which occurred between 1925 and 1943, undermined  the Persianized and Sufi-centred 
Islamic literary tradition and forced its bearers deep underground. Its transmission was 
secured by the efforts of a small number of surviving ‘ulama and   ishans, who embodied 
                                                          
32
 It could be argued that the absence of such patterns in Europe was one of the reasons for 
the failure of socialist revolutions in Germany in 1918 and Hungary in 1919.  
33
 Given that unlike Christianity, Islam does not require an institutionalized hierarchy  the 
article uses the Christian term ‘clergy’ in relation to ‘ulama  (Islamic scholars), qazi-qolons 
(supreme Islamic judges), shaykhs-ul-Islam (supreme Islamic authorities),  muftis, mullas,  
shaykhs, ishans (Sufi masters) and other representatives of Islamic authority for the sake of 
utility and simplicity only.  
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‘unofficial,’ or ‘parallel’ Islam.34 They defied the Soviet  authorities and ‘official’  Islam,  
represented by the muftiate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM),
 
which was 
established by Stalin in 1943,
35
  and continued to teach Al-Maturidi’s version of Hanafi 
Islam in  hujras (underground Islamic cells), which functioned across  historical 
Mawarannahr. Their leading authority was Muhammadjon  Rustamov, known as Hajjee 
Domla (Professor) Hindustoni (1892-1989)  (Babadzhanov, Muminov and von Kugelgen 
2007: 20).   
 
Sovietization was especially detrimental for the Islamic identity of nomadic Kazakhs, 
Kyrgyz and Turkmen because of its organic intertwining with nomadism, which was 
destroyed in the 1930s as part of the wider process of sedentarization associated with Soviet 
land reform and  collectivization (Masanov 2007:108; Khalid 2007:96). In the case of the 
Kazakhs, an aggravating factor was a huge influx into northern Kazakhstan of Russian and 
Ukrainian settlers during the 1954 Khrushchev Virgin Lands campaign. As a result, by the 
late 1930s the Kazakhs turned into an ethno-confessional minority in their republic.
36
 All 
these factors led to the transformation of tribal genealogy into the key marker of the ex-
                                                          
34
 On complex relationship between  representatives of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ Islam see 
Babadzhanov, Muminov and von Kugelgen 2007; DeWeese 2002. 
35
 The other three muftiates were the Ufa-centred muftiate which oversaw  the Tatar and 
Bashkir Sunni Muslims of  the European part of Russia; the Buynaksk-based muftiate which 
dealt with the Sunni Muslims of the North Caucasus; and the Baku-centred muftiate which 
administered the Shi’a and Sunni Muslims of Azerbaijan. For a detailed discussion of Soviet 
muftiates,  see Ro’i 2000. 
36
 According to the 1939 census, the Kazakhs made up 37.8 percent of the population of 
Kazakhstan (Vsesoyuznaiia Perepis’ 2016). 
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nomads’ identity while weakening their Muslim-ness. Their oral Islamic tradition   was 
irreversibly   damaged as a result of the Bolshevik eradication of Sufis, who were the main 
transmitters of Islam among them, and their higher level of susceptibility, compared to 
sedentary Uzbeks and Tajiks, to the version of Islam promoted by the Tashkent-based  
SADUM.
37
   
 
The theological position of SADUM
38
 was ambiguous, however. On the one hand, its first 
mufti was Eshon Bobokhon ibn Abdulmajidkhon (1858-1957), a Naqshbandi
39
 shaykh from 
Tashkent, and some other senior Islamic clergy claimed their adherence to Central Asian 
Islamic tradition. On the other hand, Moscow’s particular hostility towards Sufism was 
conducive to the strengthening within SADUM of the pro-Jadidist and pro-Salafi lobby, 
who were influenced by the teaching of  Shami Domullo al-Tarablusi (d. 1932), who came 
to Central Asia in 1919 from Lebanon via Eastern Turkestan (Safarov 2016).  Al-Tarablusi  
introduced elements of Hanbali madhhab  in his teaching. He gathered around himself a 
group of followers, known as  Ahl-i Hadith (People of Hadith), who refuted  Central Asian 
Islam  as bid’a (sinful innovation) and called for  the return to the Islam of Prophet 
Muhammad and the four righteous Caliphs and the use of  rai (opinion) and qiias  (analogy) 
                                                          
37
 Since the 1970s SADUM acted as the main Soviet  muftiate which was the exclusive  
provider of Islamic secondary and higher education through its overseeing of the Mir-i Arab  
madrasa  (secondary Islamic school) in Bukhara and the Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Institute in 
Tashkent. It also acted as an agency of Soviet ideological and cultural influence in the Middle 
East and other countries of the Muslim world (Eickelman 1993:7). 
38
 Between 1943 and 1989 the SADUM was controlled by the Bobokhon family.  
39
 According to some sources, he belonged to Yasawiyya tariqa.  See, for example, Naumkin 
2005: 39.  
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in the interpretation of hadiths.  Among the adepts of Shami Domullo’s ideas were  mufti 
Ziyovuddinkhon ibn Eshon Bobokhon (1908-1982), who succeeded his father in 1957,   
and members of his close circle (Muminov 2007:254-6; Naumkin 2005:40-3).
40
   
 
Overall, despite the historically relatively short time frame, the Sovetization of Central Asia, 
as well as of other parts of the USSR, due to its in-depth and comprehensive nature, 
radically transformed Central Asian polities and societies. It created the political, national, 
institutional, ideational and societal templates which maintain their validity a quarter of a 
century after the demise of the USSR. It further strengthened the Eurasian dimension of 
identity of Central Asians and turned them into the Central Asian type of Homo Sovieticus 
Islamicus, who largely subscribed to a secularized version of Central Asian Islam, and  
distanced  them even more  from their co-religionists in historical Eurasia, encompassing 
Xinjiang, Afghanistan, northern Iran and Turkey, and from Muslims in the Middle East.  
 
The  transformative and enduring impact  of Sovietization on Central Asia (and on most of 
post-Soviet Eurasia) suggests that the Soviet Union was a unique historical and geopolitical 
phenomenon which could not be conceptualized entirely along the same lines as the British, 
French and other Europe-centred overseas empires. Although there were a number of 
features which superficially  resembled those of European empires (e.g. the coercive 
                                                          
40 SADUM’s  pro-Salafi leaning  was reflected in the curricula of the Bukhara madrasa  
and Tashkent Islamic Institute, which instead of the study of  al-Maturidiyya and other 
medieval commentaries on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in Persian, focused  on  intensive 
training in Arabic, tajwid (the recitation of the Qur’an), tafsir (the explication of the Qur’an) 
and  hadiths  from Arabic primary sources (Khalid 2007:112).   
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sedentarization of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen, or the cotton mono-culture in 
Uzbekistan) the USSR substantially differed from them in terms of its much higher   
investment in Central Asia,   the  involvement of Central Asians in  the central political and 
economic bodies of power and its promotion of national political infrastructures and 
cultures, as well as the inclusion of Central Asians in  the nation-wide comprehensive and 
free secondary and higher education and health care.   These major differences shed some 
light on why, unlike the British, French, or Portuguese empires, which fell apart as a result 
of sometimes lengthy and often bloody national-liberation movements  in their colonies (e.g. 
India, 1757-1947; Algeria, 1954-62; Kenya, 1952-60;  South Yemen, 1963-67; 
Mozambique, 1964-1974 and Angola, 1956-1975), the dismantling of the USSR, which 
occurred largely from above, was unwelcome to all five Central Asian republics at both the 
public and private levels.
41
   
 
 
                                                          
41
 Thus, publicly at the  nation-wide referendum on the preservation of the USSR as a 
‘reformed federation of equal and sovereign states’ in March 1991, Kazakhstan voted 94% in 
favour of the preservation of the USSR; Kyrgyzstan 96.4% in favour; Uzbekistan 93.7% in 
favour; Tajikistan 95.2% in favour and Turkmenistan  97% in favour (‘Ob itogakh’ 1991). 
Those results were largely congruent with the pro-Union position of the vast majority of 
ordinary Central Asians compared with their elites.  (The author’s research findings within 
the Nuffield Foundation (UK)- funded project on ‘Islamic Radicalism in Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 2002-2005, and within the British Council-funded INSPIRE 
project on ‘Innovative Research and Teaching through the Academic Partnership between the 
University of Birmingham (UK) and the Kazakh-British Technical University (Kazakhstan), 
2010-2013).  
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The Factors of Independence and Globalization   
 
The sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 faced the elites of the five Central 
Asian republics with a difficult dilemma. They had to preserve social and political order 
and to create nation-states within borders which were imposed from above and which often 
cut across homogeneous ethnic communities.   More importantly, at least for them, in order 
to stay in power they needed to generate a new legitimizing ideology that would replace the 
supra-national Communist and Soviet ideology. It is remarkable that four out of the five 
Central Asian leaders managed to achieve this, though with different degrees of success.  
Thus, the Communist Party’s first secretaries Islam Karimov, (1938-2016), Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, (b.1940), Qahhor Mahkamov, (1932-2016)  and Saparmuratov Niyazov (1940-
2006) retained  their top jobs by repackaging themselves  as the Presidents of Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan respectively and the leaders of ruling parties that 
were created overnight. They rhetorically denounced the Soviet past, while in fact 
preserving the Sovietized version of the Eurasian political and economic model. 
Saparmuratov Niyazov went even further by first self-appointing himself as  Turkmenbashi 
- the leader   of Turkmen - in 1992,  life-time president  in 1999 and in 2002 as de facto 
prophet who had received God’s latest revelation in the form of  Ruhmana -The Book of the 
Soul – while at the same time drastically reducing the role of the legislative and judicial 
powers (Peyrouse 2012:72; 82; 93).  
 
In parallel, Absamat Masaliyev (1933-2004), the Communist Party’s first secretary of 
Kyrgyzstan, was ousted from office by Askar Akayev (b.1944),  a   non-apparatchik and 
ex-president of the Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan who aspired to break away from 
Soviet/Eurasian authoritarianism in favour of Western political liberalism, to advance the 
26 
 
development of civil society and civic, rather than ethnicity-based, citizenship.  This 
political experiment was short-lived, however, and from 2005 onwards the political process 
in Kyrgyzstan has been increasingly defined by the Eurasian model, which received a 
further boost as a result of Kyrgyzstan’s joining of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.42   
  
Across the region the vertical executive power structures have been safeguarded, as in the 
Soviet time, by powerful national security forces, successors of the KGB, which have 
ignored the new states’ proclaimed principles of people’s sovereignty, the division of 
powers and government accountability.
43
 Such structural political continuity has been 
accompanied by a radical change in the ideological discourse from supra-national Soviet 
nationhood to de facto primordial ethno-nationalism of the titular ethnic group which has 
been camouflaged by the constitutionally endorsed principles of civic nationalism. 
Epistemologically, this discourse, however, has been informed by Yulian Bromley’s   
theory of etnos.
44
 In accordance with Bromley’s notion of a nation the post-Soviet Central 
Asian leaders have mobilized archaeologists, historians and ethnographers to provide 
‘academic historical evidence’  for  their ‘legitimate’ claims to their post-Soviet territories 
                                                          
42
 Following the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 2005 Askar Akayev was ousted from office and fled to  
Moscow, where he reverted to  his academic career as professor of mathematics at Moscow 
State University. 
43
 See more on the post-Soviet transition in Central Asia in Cummings 2012; Olcott 2005; 
and  Luong 2002. 
44
 Academician Yulian Bromley (1921-90) was the leading Soviet ethnologist, the founder of 
the Soviet theory of ethnicity and nationalism, which emphasized ethnic, rather than civic, 
consciousness as the core element of nation-building (Bromley 2008).   
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and have imposed  political, administrative and  information   barriers between ethnically 
and religiously closely related peoples of historical Mawarannahr.  
 
The five new historical narratives have clashed over particular national ‘ownership’ of 
major political and cultural figures of the past. Thus,  both the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan   
leaderships  have claimed  the Genghizid roots of their respective nations with  the 
Uzbekistani elite emphasizing their Timurid, rather that  Shaybanid Uzbek origins,
45
 while 
the  Tajikistan leadership (since 1992 under Emomali Rahmon, b.1952) asserted the 
Sogdian/Samanid origins of present-day Tajiks (Dagiev 2014:72). The Kyrgyz elite has 
chosen heroes of the 16
th
 century Kyrgyz epic Manas as their ethnic forebears  (Sultanova 
2014: 22), while  the  Turkmen elite opted for the heroes of  the early 17
th
  century  epic  
Koroghlu  (Peyrouse, 2012: 59). It is significant that all post-Soviet Central Asian political 
elites have derived  their historical legitimacy from their pre-Islamic or semi-Islamic 
nomadic, or urbanized  ancestors, rather than from major Islamic figures associated with the 
region’s Islamicization by Arabs in the seventh century AD and its subsequent inclusion 
within Arab Islamic Caliphates, centred in Medina (632-662),  Damascus (661-750) and 
Baghdad  (750-1258). By contrast,  famous  Central Asian Islamic thinkers, e.g. Al-Bukhari, 
Al-Farabi, or great Sufi teachers - e.g. Khoja Ahmed Yasawi  and  Baha-ud-Din Naqshband 
                                                          
45
 Between the 14
th
 and 16
th
 centuries the nomadic Shaybanid Turco-Mongol Persianized  
empire existed on the territory of present-day Central Asia and parts of Afghanistan and Iran. 
Shaybanids were the first to assume the name of Uzbeks after Uzbeg Khan (1282-1341), the 
longest reigning khan of the Golden Horde. In the 1460s the Shaybanid empire split into two 
parts as a result of the rebellion of Janybek Khan (d.1480) against Abu Khayr Khan (1412-
1468) (Soucek 2000:149-161; Masanov 2007:98-100).  
28 
 
- have been turned into cultural, rather than Islamic, national symbols (Yemelianova 2014: 
292).   
 
In general, the relationship with Islam of both the post-Soviet Central Asian elites and the 
wider public has been unhappy. On the surface it appears that all the Central Asian 
republics, like other post-Soviet Muslim-majority regions, have experienced an Islamic 
revival which was triggered by the end of official atheism and the restoration of their links 
with the wider Islamic world. Islamic symbols have been integrated in the five nationalizing 
discourses to ensure a cultural break from historically Orthodox Christian Russia. The 
republics witnessed an unprecedented Islamic building boom, resulting in the emergence of 
many hundreds of mosques, madrasas,  as well as Islamic and Islamo-national political 
parties and social organizations.  In the first years of independence Central Asian 
parliaments, except in Turkmenistan, adopted new and liberal religious laws which 
provided a framework for various Islam-related activities, including a many-fold increase in 
the number of hajjees (pilgrims) to Mecca and Medina. They also welcomed the activities 
of foreign Islamic funds, preachers and teachers from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt, 
Turkey and other Muslim countries. The leaders of the republics endorsed the formation of 
national muftiates which split from the Soviet era Tashkent-based SADUM and secured 
membership of their respective states in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation                                                                   
(OIC).
 46
 
 
   
It could be argued, however, that the Islamic revival has been more symbolic than genuine 
in nature. In practice, and especially from the mid-1990s onwards, official policies towards 
                                                          
46
 See more on Islamic trajectories in post-Soviet Central Asia in Sagdeev and Eisenhower 
2000; Naumkin 2005; Khalid 2007and Yemelianova 2010.   
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Islam and Muslims have been congruent with the imperial Russian/Soviet approach 
outlined earlier.
47
 The geographical closeness of Central Asia to Taliban-infiltrated 
Afghanistan has been behind the particularly tough state crackdown on political Islam and 
other forms of ‘unofficial Islam.’ Among the main government targets have been members 
and sympathizers of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its successor the Islamic Movement of Turkestan 
(IMT), Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islamii (Party of Islamic Liberation, HT),  the Jund al-Khalifat 
(Soldiers of Caliphate, JK) and the Islamic state of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) which were 
banned in all five republics.
48
  At the societal level,   Central Asian Muslims at large have 
remained aloof from the global jihadist mobilization message and maintained  their 
allegiance to the Soviet-era legacy of secularism, intertwined with  Central Asian Islam,  
important features of which have been disengagement from politics, the merger with   
Genghizid  adats (customary norms), Zoroastrian and  Tengrian  beliefs and rituals and 
strong oral Sufi and musical traditions  intertwined with shamanism.
49
  This resilience of 
                                                          
47
 This is confirmed by the author’s comparative analysis of Islamic trajectories in post-Soviet 
Islamic space. See Yemelianova 2010. 
48
 For more on these organizations, see in Karagiannis  2010; Naumkin 2005;  Rashid 2002; 
Tuckers 2016 and Karin 2016. 
49
 This conclusion is based on my field-work findings  in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan  in the period between 1999 and 2014, as well as findings of other scholars who 
conducted empirical research  in the region  (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014; Khamidov 
2013; Louw 2008; Montgomery 2007; Rasanayagam 2011; Salmorbekova&Yemelianova 
2010). 
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Central Asian Islam  has been under-emphasized because of the focus of Western 
scholarship and media on Central Asian Islamists.
50
   
 
However, Central Asia has not been entirely immune to Islamic radicalism, as evidenced by 
IRPT, IMU, IMT, HT, JK and the ISIL Khorasan Vilayet (Khorasan Province), which 
numbers between several hundreds and a few thousands.
51
  There have been a few Islamist 
enclaves in the Ferghana valley, as well as in western Kazakhstan. However, the factors of 
Islamic radicalization, as well as the mobilizing narratives that have been employed there, 
have differed significantly from those in both the Middle East and the West. They have 
been determined primarily by domestic issues, such as economic hardship, lack of 
opportunities, the pervasive corruption of local authorities, and the heavy-handedness of the 
police and security services. My findings have also revealed that most local Islamists and 
their sympathizers were not seriously concerned with major radicalizing issues among 
Muslims in the Middle East and the West, such as the Western policies in the Middle East, 
including the Western support of Israel against the Palestinians, or  the perceived cultural 
offence and discrimination related to Islamic dress, or the mocking/ caricaturing of the 
Prophet Muhammad  in publicly available publications, arts exhibitions and theatre   
                                                          
50
 For a critique of the Western academic preoccupation with Islamic radicalism and jihadism 
in Central Asia see Heathershaw and Montgomery  2014.  
 
51 According to the data of the CSCE in Europe, in 2015 among ISIL fighters there were  
500 Uzbeks, 360 Turkmen, 250 Kazakhs and 100 Kyrgyz (Hearing 2015:43). Other sources 
suggest that in 2015 the total number of Central Asian ISIL fighters was around 4,000 
(Malashenko 2015 and Tucker 2016).  
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(Yemelianova 2010:239-240). This is not to say that there has been no Central Asian 
jihadists who did embrace the global jihadist message. However, the number of those was 
limited. Some of them were trained in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border zone by jihadist 
instructors, many of whom originated from Muslim communities in Europe, while some 
others had predominantly a virtual existence.
52
 
  
Thus, in relative terms, the number of Central Asians fighting within ISIL has been much 
lower than the number of European jihadists.  Thus, out of around 25,000 foreign ISIL 
fighters Central Asian jihadists constitute only a tiny minority of the total Muslim 
population. Even if we accept the highest possible estimate of around 4,000 Central Asian 
jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq, this will make up around 0.006 % of the total population 
of Muslim Central Asia of 66 million.
53
  This is incomparably lower than the number of 
Western European jihadists who joined ISIL. 
 
For example,  Belgium-born ISIL fighters 
constitute around 0.9% of the total Muslim population of Belgium of 672,000; ISIL fighters 
coming from Sweden constitute 0. 06 % of the total Muslim population of Sweden of 0.5m; 
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 Among the latter were, for example,  members of so called the Kazakh Islamic Jihad, the 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (Army of Mahdi),  Jamaat Ansarullah (Community of Supporters of Allah), 
Imam Bukhari Jamaat (Community of Imam Bukhari), Sabiri Jamaat (Sabiri Community).  
See Karin 2016: 84, 133,142,153.  
53
 For comparison, the number of Russia’s Muslims (mainly of Caucasian and Tatar origins) 
fighting for ISIL is estimated to be between 4, 000 and 7, 000 out of a total Muslim 
population of around 20 m; the number of Azerbaijani jihadists is around 500 out of a total 
Muslim population of 9 m and the number of Georgia’s jihadists (mainly Chechens from the 
Pankisi gorge)  is  around  400 out of a total Muslim population of  0.3m (Burchuladze 2015; 
Yarlykapov 2015).   
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French-born ISIL fighters make up 0.03% of  the total Muslim population of France of 
4.5m;  and UK-born jihadists also constitute 0.03% of the total UK Muslim population of 
2.7m (Number of Fighters 2016).  Also, many Central Asian ISIL fighters, with the 
exception of Kazakhs (ISIS 2014; Karin 2016), came not from Central Asia per se, but from 
Central Asian immigrant communities in non-Muslim regions. The cases in point are some 
Uzbek, Tajik and other Central Asian labour migrants in the Russian-majority Urals
 54
 who 
became radicalized as a result of their socio-cultural segregation and discrimination which 
was not dissimilar to that among various Muslim migrants in the West.   
 
 
Conclusion 
Central Asian Islam was shaped by the Sogdian/Samanid-Genghizid- Al-Muturidiyya 
cultural and Islamic influences.  It has been characterized by the predominance in it of the 
Sufi tradition, its intertwining with pre-Islamic Shamanist, Zoroastrian and Tengrian beliefs, 
Islamized Sasanid rituals and Genghizid  adats, as well as by its apolitical, flexible and 
adaptable nature. For this reason, compared to Islam in the Islamic heartland with its 
centres in Mecca, Medina, Damascus and Baghdad, it has not played the key role in the 
legitimization of political authority of Central Asian rulers, who prioritized genealogy over 
Islamic law, and it has only rarely served as a mobilizing political ideology (for example,  
as in the Basmachi  movement in the 1920s and 1930s)  in Central Asians’ numerous 
conflicts  with  external invaders.   
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 On Islamic radicalization of Central Asian labour migrants in the Urals see Malashenko 
and Starostin 2015.   
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The shared Genghizid legacy smoothed the governance of Central Asia by imperial and 
Bolshevik Russia and enabled the later to extrapolate to Central Asia the Russian model of 
state-Muslim relations, created by Catherine the Great.  It included the promotion of state-
sponsored apolitical ‘official’ Islam, the suppression of any other forms of ‘unofficial’ 
Islam and the segregation of home Muslims from their co-religionists abroad. This model 
has maintained its centrality after the dissolution of the USSR, although   ‘official’ Islam  
has been widely rebranded as ‘traditional’ Islam, and ‘unofficial’ Islam  as ‘untraditional’ 
Islam. Since the late 1990s, and especially in the wake of 9/11, the Central Asian official 
discourse on ‘untraditional’ Islam has been securitized and criminalized along the same 
lines as the Russian official discourse, which arguably has been of considerable influence 
across Muslim Eurasia.  
 
Along the same lines, Central Asian Islam has largely retained its disengagement from 
Islamist trajectories in both the Middle East and the West, though its historical 
disengagement from politics has been increasingly challenged by the continuing socio-
economic hardships and political repression within particular Central Asian republics, as 
well as by the greater digital exposure of young Central Asians to Islamic messages 
emanating from outside the region. Particularly susceptible to these messages have been 
Uzbek and Tajik labour migrants in Russia and other non Muslim-majority countries, as 
well as Kazakhs and Kyrgyz within their respective republics whose Islamic identity was 
destroyed, or at least severely undermined, by their Soviet sedentarization. This also 
explains a larger number of conversions among them to Protestantism (Pentecostalism, 
Evangelical Christianity, Baptism, Methodism, etc), compared to that among the Uzbeks 
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and Tajiks.
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  In the long term, the perpetuation of distinctive  Central Asian Islam  will be 
determined by the ability of Central Asian political elites to ensure the viable social, 
economic and political development of their  respective countries, to overcome  nationalist 
isolationism and to restore a full-fledged societal and political  interaction  across Central 
Asia and the wider post-Genghizid Eurasia. As for scholarship, I am arguing that an 
adequate understanding of contemporary Central Asian Islam and Muslims must be 
informed by an approach that avoids mono-theoretical compartmentalization and 
recognizes the significance of their historical, theological and Eurasian contextualization.  
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